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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
EDWIN F. HUNT*
I CONSTITUTIONAL AmENDMNTS
During the period under consideration the most important develop-
ments for Tennessee in the field of Constitutional Law were amend-
ments to the State Constitution. This Constitution, adopted in 1870,
was the oldest unamended constitution in the United States until
eight proposed amendments were ratified by the voters on November
3, 1953. That the Tennessee Constitution had been unchanged for so
many years was the result of several factors, most obvious of which
was the fact that such constitution was especially difficult to amend.
Under the amending provision' amendments required approval of a
majority of the entire membership of both Houses of one Legislature,
approval of two-thirds of the members of both Houses of the next
Legislature, followed by ratification at an election at which such pro-
posals are approved "by a majority of all the citizens of the State, vot-
ing for Representatives, voting in their favor... ." Hence, an amend-
ment finally proposed for ratification at an election was not necessarily
adopted when approval was given by a majority, or even an over-
whelming majority, of those voting with respect to it. Those who
stayed away from the polls or refrained from voting were, in practical
effect, casting a negative vote. It is obvious why both lawyers 2 and
political scientists3 have stressed the extreme difficulty of adopting
specific amendments by this method.
The amending provision also permits of a constitutional convention4
and the Tennessee Constitution was finally amended by resorting to
the device of a limited constitutional convention. The advantage of
this method, the "Constitutional Convention Route," over the method
previously attempted, the "Amendment Route," lies in the fact that
the proposal or proposals of the Convention may be ratified and
adopted at an election by approval of a mere majority of those voting
on the proposal or proposals. To be effective, such election does not
require the participation of any specified proportion of the electorate.
* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; Assistant General Counsel,
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R.R.
1. TENN. CONST. Art. XI, § 3.
2. Sims, Limited Constitutional Convention in Tennessee, 21 TENN. L. REV.
1 (1949).
3. Williams, The Calling of a Limited Constitutional Convention, 21 TENN.
L. REV. 249 (1950).
4. TENN. CONST. Art. XI, § 3, includes this sentence: "The Legislature shall
have the right, at anytime, by law, to submit to the people the question of
calling a Convention to alter, reform or abolish this Constitution, and when,.
upon such submission, a majority of all the votes cast shall be in favor of said
proposition, then delegates shall be chosen, and the Convention shall assemble
in such mode and manner as shall be prescribed."
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The practical disadvantage of the "Constitutional Convention Route"
had been the apprehension, supported by an opinion of the Attorney
General, that a constitutional convention, once assembled, could pro-
pose amendments or alterations other than those to which the enabling
act sought to limit it.
A constitutional convention with its power limited to proposing
amendments to specified provisions of the Constitution was made prac-
ticable by a decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee that a legis-
lative act is valid which submits to the voters the question whether
a constitutional convention shall be held with limited power to pro-
pose amendments to specified sections of the Constitution and that a
convention called pursuant to such law would be legally restricted as
provided by the act.5 The first such limited constitutional convention
was defeated by vote of the people, apparently because one of the
subject matters for consideration was amendment of the taxing clause 7
so as to permit classification of property. A second attempt8 was suc-
cessful, the holding of a limited constitutional convention being ap-
proved by the voters in August, 1952. Delegates to such convention
were elected in November, 1952; the convention assembled in April,
1953; and eight proposed amendments were adopted by ratification at
the polls in November, 1953. Although such amendments were ratified
by receiving a majority of the votes cast at the special election, the
vote in favor of such proposals was not sufficiently large to have re-
sulted in ratification by the "Amendment Route."
A summary of the eight amendments which were adopted is as
follows:
(1) The amending clause9 was itself amended, both as to the Amend-
ment Route and the Constitutional Convention Route.
As to the Amendment Route, the Constitution of 1870 authorized
the legislature to propose amendments not oftener than once in six
years. By one of the changes of 1953 this limitation is deleted, but
there remains a limitation upon such proposals of not oftener than
once in four years. Such limitation results from the fact that proposals
for amendments are to be voted upon by the people "at the next
general election in which a Governor is to be chosen." Amendments
also require for ratification "a majority of all the citizens of the State
voting for Governor, voting in their favor.... ." The reason for chang-
ing the requirement from a majority of those voting for Representa-
tives to a majority of those voting for Governor is that the former
provides a complex and difficult standard, while the latter provides
a simple standard or measure. The difficulty of determining how many
5. Cummings v. Beeler, 189 Tenn. 151, 223 S.W. 2d 913 (1949).
6. Proposed by Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 49.
7. TENN. CONST. Art. II, § 28.
8. Proposed by Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 130.
9. TENN. CONST. Art. XI, § 3.
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persons voted for representatives results from the fact that certain
legislative districts elect more than one representative. Davidson
County, for example, elects six representatives.10 Here every voter
may have voted for six representatives, but many voters may have
voted for a lesser number of representatives,-a situation which makes
it well-nigh impossible to determine exactly how many persons voted
in the legislative races.
As to the Constitutional Convention Route, the validity of a limited
constitutional convention, previously established by judicial decision"
was expressly written into the amending provision, 2 but there was
added a limitation that "no such convention shall be held oftener than
once in six years."
(2) The provision relating to compensation of members of the
General Assembly was also amended. 3 Since 1870 this section had
provided for compensation of four dollars per day for legislators. By
the amendment there was provided fifteen dollars per day in lieu of
four dollars per day, i.e., "$10.00 per day compensation and $5.00 per
day for expenses." The amended section also provides a method for
increasing or reducing the specified compensation and allowance for
expenses. A reduction may be effected by law enacted in regular
session, but an increase requires "law enacted in two consecutive
regular sessions."
(3) The term of office of the Governor was changed." Heretofore
10. TENN. CODE ANN. § 143 (Williams 1934).
11. Cummings v. Beeler, 189 Tenn. 151, 223 C.W.2d 913 (1949).
12. TENN. CONST. Art. XI, § 3, as amended, includes a provision that "no
change in, or amendment to, this Constitution proposed by such convention
shall become effective, unless within the limitations of the call of the con-
vention."
13. TENx. CONST. Art. II, § 23, which, as amended, reads as follows:
"Each member of the General Assembly shall be allowed $10.00
per day compensation and $5.00 per day for expenses, and $4.00 for
every twenty-five miles traveling to and from the seat of government.
No member shall be paid for more than seventy-five days of a regular
session, nor for more than twenty days of an extra or called session,
nor for any day when absent from his seat in the Legislature unless
physically unable to attend. The Senators, when sitting as a Court
of Impeachment, shall each receive $10.00 per day compensation and
$5.00 per day for expenses for each day of actual attendance. The
compensation and allowance for expenses of the members of the Gen-
eral Assembly may from time to time be reduced by any General
Assembly by law enacted in regular session, and may be increased
from time to time by law enacted in two consecutive regular sessions
of the General Assembly. No increase or reduction shall take effect
until the next regular session after such law shall have been finally
enacted."
14. By revision of Art. III, § 4, TENN. CONST., which, as amended, reads:
"The Governor hereafter elected shall hold office for four years,
and until his successor shall be elected and qualified. One succeeding
to the vacated office during the first eighteen calendar months of such
term shall hold office until his successor to such vacated office is elected
at the following election for members of the General Assembly and
qualified for the remainder of the term, as provided in Section 2 of
this Article and Section 8 of Article II; and one succeeding to said
1954 ]
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the Governor has been elected for a term of two years, with eligibility
limited to six years in any term of eight. Hereafter, by reason of the
amendment the Governor will be elected for a term of four years, with
ineligibility for the succeeding term. One who becomes Governor as
the result of a vacancy during the term, and thus serves less than a
full four year term, is not ineligible for the succeeding term.
Where a vacancy in the office of Governor occurs during the first
18 months of the term, there is an election at the regular November
election to fill such vacated office for the remainder of the term,1r but
where such vacancy occurs subsequent to the first 18 months, there
is no such election and the person temporarily filling the vacancy
serves for the remainder of the term.
(4) The provision relating to the governor's veto powerl was
changed in two important respects. The original provision included
the following: "If the Governor shall fail to return any bill, with his
objections, within five days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have
been presented to him, the same shall become a law without his sig-
nature, unless the General Assembly, by its adjournment 1 prevents
its return, in which case it shall not become a law." Under similar
constitutional provisions in other states there is a division of authority
as to whether a bill may become a law by signature of the Governor
after final adjournment of the legislature.' s No decision in Tennessee
has dealt with the question, but for many years the assumption has
been that all bills not signed by the Governor prior to final adjourn-
ment of the legislature were killed and no instance is known where
a Governor of Tennessee has signed a bill after such adjournment.
The practice in Tennessee has been for both legislative houses to
"stop the clock" when the hour for sine die adjournment approaches
and for -the two speakers not to declare such adjournment until advice
has been received from the Governor that he has completed considera-
tion of all bills sent to him. This practice required the Governor, the
speakers and legislative and executive employees to work far into
the night. 9 Because a large number of bills are enacted in the closing
vacated office subsequent to the first eighteen months of the term
shall continue to hold office for the remainder of the full term. No
Governor elected and qualified for a four year term shall be eligible
for the succeeding term."
15. The vacated office would be temporarily filled by the speaker of the
Senate, those next in line being the speaker of the House, the secretary of
state and the state comptroller. TENN. CONST. Art. III, § 12, and TENN. CODE
Supp. § 187.1 (1950).
16. TENN. CONST. Art. III, § 18. As revised, this provision is lengthy and
its full quotation is not essential to an explanation of the changes made.
17. Such adjournment means final adjournment. Johnson City v. Tenn.
Eastern Electric Co., 133 Tenn. 632, 182 S.W. 587 (1915).
18. 50 AM. Jur., Statutes § 120 (1944); 82 C.J.S., Statutes § 50 (1953); Note,
64 A.L.R. 1468 (1930).
19. The practice under the Federal Constitution was similar prior to 1932
when Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 52 Sup. Ct. 627, 76 L. Ed. 1239
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days of a legislative session, such practice required the Governor to
make hurried decision as to his action on many bills.
20  I
The amended veto provision now includes the following:
"The Governor may approve, sign, and file in the bffice of the
Secretary of State within ten days after the adjournment of the
General Assembly any bill presented to him for signature during 'the
last five days of the session, and when thus approved the same shall
become a law. If the General Assembly, by its adjournment, prevents
the return of any bill within said five-day "period it shall become a
law, unless disapproved by the Governor and filed by him with his
objections, in the office of the Secretary of State, within ten days
after such adjournment."
Thus, the Governor may still "pocket veto" a bill presented to him
during -the last five days of the session in the sense that he need not
return it disapproved to the legislature and afford opportunity for
passage over the veto, but the Governor cannot "pocket veto" in the
sence of disapproval by inaction alone. He must specifically disapprove
or else a pending bill will automatically become law.
The second major change in the veto provision gives the Governor
power to "reduce or disapprove the sum of money appropriated by
any one or more items or parts of items" in an appropriation bill. Like
the traditional veto, such partial or item veto must be exercised
within five days (Sundays excepted) after presentation of the bill to
the Governor and may be overridden by repassage in the legislature.
Article III, section 18, as amended, also prescribes conditions for the
exercise of such partial or item veto during the closing days of a legis-
lative session, the most significant being with respect to bills presented
to the Governor during the five days before final adjournment, in
which case the partial veto must be exercised not later than the day
following presentation of the bill to him, unless this be prevented by
final adjournment.
(5) For many years, subject to limitations as to age and exemptions,
payment of a poll tax was a prerequisite to voting in Tennessee,
either in general elections or in state-wide primaries.2' The legislature
attempted to repeal the poll tax 22 imposed by legislative act enacted
pursuant to a constitutional mandate, but the Tennessee Supreme
Court, with two of the five Justices dissenting, held the repealing Act
to be unconstitutional.23 In 1949, the legislature greatly diminished the
(1932), determined that a bill passed by Congress may be signed by the
President within ten days after it is presented to him, though signed after
final adjournment.
20. In 1953 of 269 general laws enacted, 144 were signed by the Governor on
the final day. See Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, pp. 460-950.
21. T.NN. CONST. Art. II, § 28 and Art. IV, § 1; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 1082,
1558, 1559, 2027 (Williams 1934); Tenn. Pub. Acts 1937 (2d Ex. Session), c. 2.
22. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1943, c. 37.
23. Biggs v. Beeler,' 180 Tenn. 198, 173 S.W.2d 144 (1943).
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practical importance-of the poll tax as a qualification upon the right
of suffrage by a series of laws which abolished the poll tax require-
ment for state-wide primary elections, 24 exempted women from the
payment of poll tax,2 5 made the poll tax collectible only for one year
following delinquency,26 and exempted from the poll tax all ex-
servicemen who were honorably discharged.27 In 1951 an Act was
enacted providing that the only poll tax, payment of which was a
prerequisite to voting, was that "for the year 1871" if lawfully as-
sessed.
28
That which had been accomplished by various, and perhaps devious,
legislature acts-the destruction of the poll tax as a prerequisite to
voting-was confirmed and expressly included in the Constitution by
amendment of Article IV, section 1. As amended, this section provides
that a voter shall be twenty-one years of age,29 a citizen of the United
States, a resident of the State for twelve months and of the county
for three months, and "there shall be no other qualification attached
to the right of suffrage."
(6-7) Probably the most important constitutional amendments
adopted were two relating to home rule for cities and counties.30 To
indicate the extent and significance of these changes requires state-
ment of the practices previously followed. For many years it had
been established by decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court that an
act affecting a county or municipality in its governmental or political
capacity was not unconstitutional merely because it was restricted in
operation to one county or municipality.31 Taking full advantage of
this principle, the Tennessee legislature at each biennial session has
enacted a mass of local or private acts, which have legislated locally
in the most minute detail and often by the most drastic alterations of
existing law.32 Because of the prevalence of the custom known as
"legislative courtesy," such local or private laws are the decision or
judgment of the entire legislature only in name and form. This legis-
lative practice, so closely adhered to as to be almost without exception,
is that the Senate will pass any local bill having the support of the
24. TENN. CODE SUPP. § 2227.15 (1950); Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 57.
25. TENN. CODE SUPP. § 1082 (1950); Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 62.
26. TENN. CODE SUPP. § 1494.1 (1950); Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 236.
27. TENN. CODE SUPP. § 2043.2 (1950); Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 111.
28. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 63.
29. Efforts to lower the age for voting to eighteen years were defeated in
the constitutional convention.
30. These were numbers 6 and 7, which added new provisions to TENN.
CONST. Art. XI, § 9.
31. State v. Wilson, 80 Tenn. 246 (1883); Redistricting Cases, 111 Tenn. 234
(1903).
32. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1953, which are 592 in number, fill 1970 printed pages.
Tenn. Priv. Acts 1947, which are 878 in number, fill 3487 printed pages.
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local senator (or senators) and the House will pass any local bill
having the support of the local representative (or representatives).33
Conversely, the Senate will pass no local bill opposed by the local
senator and the House will pass no local bill opposed by the local
representative.
Hence, in fact as distinguished from constitutional theory, the power
to enact or to defeat local legislation has not been exercised by the
entire assembly, but it has been delegated to the local representatives.
In many instances the local delegation is one member of the House
and one member of the Senate. Where one county is represented in
the Senate by a senator residing in another county, such senator often
accepts the wishes of the member of the House who resides in the
former county as decisive of its local legislation.
Many conscientious and politically-wise legislators have never spon-
sored local legislation without consulting the city council, the quar-
terly county court or other public officials of the governmental sub-
division to be affected thereby. Also some local legislation is the final
decision of an issue raised and resolved by the political campaign as
a result of which the legislator was chosen. But every legislative ses-
sion has produced some, perhaps numerous, private acts which have
been claimed to be contrary to the recommendations of the public
officers of the city or county affected and which were not publicly
advocated nor even mentioned in the election campaign. Many of
these claims appear to have been well-founded, and instances of local
acts which were spite legislation or ripper bills have been too frequent.
Thus, the legislative machinery has been diverted and used to give
the form of legislation to that which represented at best a few persons'
sound judgment or at worst one individual's harmful caprice. Amend-
ments to the Constitution, designed to change substantially the prior
practice and to destroy the evils of local legislation, were adopted.
(a) A provision designed to secure a substantial amount of home
rule for both cities and counties was added to Article XI, section 9.34
Under this provision, the legislature may not pass any private act (1)
which removes an incumbent from any municipal or county office, or
33. Where the local senators (or representatives) are in disagreement, the
usual, but not invariable, result has been legislative inaction.
34. The Amendment reads as follows:
"The General Assembly shall have no power to pass a special,
local or private act having the effect of removing the incumbent from
any municipal or county office or abridging the term or altering the
salary prior to the end of the term for which such public officer was
selected, and any act of the General Assembly private or local in form
or effect applicable to a particular county or municipality either in its
governmental or its proprietary capacity shall be void and of no
effect unless the act by its terms either requires the approval by a
two-thirds vote of the local legislative body of the municipality or
county, or requires approval in an election by a majority of those
voting in said election in the municipality or county affected."
1954 ]
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(2) which alters the salary prior to the end of the term. These prohi-
bitions are applicable even though the local act has the approval of the
local legislative body. Changes in salaries and terms of office of local
officers, if made by private act of the General Assembly, must not take
effect sooner than the expiration of the incumbent's term. When
local officers have long terms, proposed changes may be delayed for
several years.35
Under such provision also, the legislature has no power to pass any
local act unless it requires approval (a) of two-thirds vote of the
local legislative body, or (b) by popular approval in a referendum
election.
(b) Another amendment to Article XI, section 9, provides optional
home rule for cities.36 Under this provision any municipality may be-
come a home rule city as the result of a local election in which a ma-
jority of the qualified voters approve the proposal. Until the voters
of such home rule city decide otherwise by a similar election, such
city is "a home rule municipality" and the General Assembly cannot
legislate for it by local act, but can legislate as to it only by general
law. Such home rule city may retain its existing charter, or it may
amend it, or it may adopt another one.
The general method for amending the charter of a home rule city is
by proposal by the local legislative body (i. e. "by ordinance") or by
proposal by a charter commission, 7 followed by publication of the
proposal and approval thereof in a municipal election at the same time
as the first general state election held at least 60 days after such
publication. Such proposal becomes effective 60 days after approval.
A most important and far-reaching feature of this provision is the
following: "The General Assembly shall by general law provide the
exclusive methods by which municipalities may be created, merged,
consolidated and dissolved and by which municipal boundaries may
be altered." Heretofore, cities could be created by the method pres-
cribed by general law38 or by special act. Very few Tennessee cities
have been incorporated under the general law, and the overwhelming
majority of cities possess special act charters. The legislature 'has
also possessed the power, without the consent of the inhabitants
affected, to annex adjacent territory to an existing city by special
35. For example, under the charter of the City of Nashville, Tenn. Priv.
Acts 1947, c. 246, members of the board of park commissioners and of the
electric power board have staggered terms of five years each.
36. This amendment is quite lengthy and its full quotation is not deemed
essential here.
37. Either a charter commission provided for by general law or,. in the
absence of such general law, a charter commission chosen as prescribed by
this constitutional provision.
38. TEN. CODE ANm. § 3292 et seq. (Williams 1934).
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act.3 9 In actual practice this has been the customary method of
corporate extension,40 despite the existence of a general act under
which annexation may be accomplished.
41
Hereafter, the General Assembly will no longer possess the power
to create municipalities by private act, nor will it be able to alter
municipal boundaries by such act. As a practical matter, it will be
most difficult, if not impossible, for a city to extend its boundaries so
that corporate growth may keep pace with economic growth, unless
a carefully planned and comprehensive general act is enacted. Sec-
tions 3320 and 3321 of the Code of Tennessee, providing for annexation
after petition and referendum election confined to the voters of the
area to be annexed, have not led to extension of municipal boundaries
and are not likely to do so.
(8) The final amendment adopted in 1953, also to Article XI, section
9,42 makes possible the consolidation of governmental or corporate
functions of a county and of a municipality therein. Such consolida-
tion requires approval by a majority of the voters of the city voting
in an election and also approval by a majority of those voting in the
county outside of the city.
II JUDiciAL DEcIsIoNs
During the period under consideration only a small number of cases
decided by the appellate courts of Tennessee involved constitutional
questions. There was no express departure from any constitutional
doctrine previously established and no prior decision of a constitu-
tional question was specifically overruled, disapproved or limited.
The published opinions dealing with constitutional questions were
usually concise, if not disappointingly brief and meager. Cases in-
volving constitutional questions not discussed in other articles of this
Survey43 were as follows:
39. Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. 487, 15 S.W. 364 (1891); Town of Oneida
v. Hardwood Flooring Co., 169 Tenn. 449, 88 S.W.2d 998 (1935).
40. Tenn. Priv. Acts of 1953 changed city limits in no fewer than 45 instances.
41. TENN. CODE ANN., §§ 3320-3321 (Williams 1934).
42. This amendment adds the following:
"The General Assembly may provide for the consolidation of any
or all of the governmental and corporate functions now or hereafter
vested in municipal corporations with the governmental and corporate
functions now or hereafter vested in the counties in which such mu-
nicipal corporations are located; provided, such consolidations shall
not become effective until submitted to the qualified voters residing
within the municipal corporation and in the county outside thereof,
and approved by a majority of those voting within the municipal
corporation and by a majority of those voting in the county outside
the municipal corporation."
43. Constitutional Law questions chiefly concerned with an independent
field of law are left for discussion in the pertinent articles of this Survey.
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A. Conditions under which validity determined
The caution, or even reluctance, with which courts approach con-
stitutional questions was demonstrated in two cases. In one of these44
the Supreme Court of Tennessee avoided the constitutional question
sought to be raised by application of the established principle that
courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute upon com-
plaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
In the other 45 the same court relied upon the equally well settled
rule that courts will pass upon the constitutionality of an ordinance
or statute only when such action is necessary to a disposition of the
case.
State ex rel. Turner v. Wilson46 was an action of mandamus by
municipal officers designated in a statute providing a new charter
for Middleton, to compel the incumbents to surrender their offices
to the new officials. The terms of office of the defendants had expired
and they were "hold-over" officials. By demurrer to the bill defendants
challenged the constitutionality of the statute providing the new
charter. The Chancellor held that defendants had no right to assail
the constitutionality of the Act and also held that it was constitutional.
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed and held on the authority of
its earlier decision 47 that the officers holding beyond the expiration
of their term had no special interest in their offices which entitled
them to attack the constitutionality of the new city charter of incorpo-
ration designating new officials to serve. So holding, the Supreme
Court did not reach the question of constitutionality.
City of Greenfield v. Callins', involved a municipal ordinance
which provided that "every person a non-resident who comes regularly
within the city in pursuit of some business or occupation, and who
operates regularly an automobile . . . shall . . . register his motor
vehicle with the city clerk . .. and shall pay an annual fee of $3."
Mrs. Callins, living outside Greenfield, drove daily to her job in that
city in an automobile which was owned by and licensed in the name
of her husband. She was fined in city court for violation of the ordi-
nance and appealed to the Circuit Court, which remitted the fine and
construed the ordinance as not applicable because Mrs. Callins was
not the owner of the automobile.
On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court by the City, defendant
attacked the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Court in an
opinion by Justice Gailor did not reach the question of constitution-
44. State ex rel Turner v. Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1954).
45. City of Greenfield v. Callins, 195 Tenn. 285, 259 S.W.2d 525 (1953).
46. 264 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1954).
47. Kimsey v. Hyatt, 169 Tenn. 599, 89 S.W.2d 887 (1936).
48. 195 Tenn. 285, 259 S.W.2d 525 (1953).
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ality. The Court applied -the rule of interpretation that a law imposing
a tax or license is to be construed strictly against the taxing authorities
and in favor of the taxpayer, and construed the ordinance as imposing
a duty of registration only on owners of motor vehicles.
B. Legal Effect of Unconstitutionality.
Different aspects of the troublesome question as to the legal effect
of unconstitutionality were presented in two cases.
49
State v. Superintendent, Davidson County Workhouse,50 opinion by
Chief Justice Neil, held unconstitutional the provision of a special
act constituting the charter of the City of Nashville,51 pursuant to
which had been established a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of the City of Nashville, and thereby determined that such court had
no legal existence. The challenged provision of the special act author-
ized the Mayor and City Council to provide by ordinance for a Juvenile
Court with a judge to be appointed by the Mayor for a term of office
the same as that of the Mayor, such judge to have been a member
of the bar of Tennessee for not less than seven years and a resident
of Davidson County for not less than two years. Such charter pro-
vision was held violative of the sections of the Tennessee Constitution
providing for inferior courts to be established by the legislature52 and
providing for the election of the judges of such courts by the people,
the term of office of such judge to be eight years and his qualifications
to be the age of thirty, residence in the State for five years and resi-
dence in the circuit or district for one year.5 3
The conflict between the Constitution and the statute is manifest,
despite the fact that such court had functioned without challenge for
a decade.54 Not only was the Juvenile Court created by municipal
ordinance rather than by the legislature as provided in the Consti-
tution, but also the method of selecting the judge, his term of office
and his qualifications as fixed by the ordinance differed from the con-
stitutional requirements as to these matters.
This decision is, however, distinctly unsettling as to a legal principle
previously declared in Tennessee. The unconstitutionality of the
Juvenile Court of Nashville was adjudicated upon a petition for writ
of habeas corpus filed by a relator who was in custody under sentence
imposed by that court. In holding that a petitioner in habeas corpus
may be discharged where the court by which he was sentenced and
committed had no legal existence, the Tennessee Supreme Court
49. State v. Superintendent, Davidson County Workhouse, 195 Tenn. 265, 259
S.W.2d 159 (1953); Bricker v. Sims, 195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953).
50. 195 Tenn. 265, 259 S.W.2d 159 (1953).
51. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1947, c. 246, article 51.
52. TENN. CONST. Art. VI, § 1.
53. TENN. CONST. Art. VI, § 4.
54. The challenged provision of the charter of Nashville enacted in 1947
was contained in the previous charter, i.e., Tenn. Priv. Acts 1943, c. 47.
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applied "a well-settled general rule,"5 but in so holding the court
ignored and disregarded its earlier decision of Beaver v. Hall50 reach-
ing a contrary result by application of the principle that there may be
a de facto court as well as a de facto judge.5
7
Beaver v. Hall, supra, involved petitions for habeas corpus by Hall
and others who had been sentenced to the county workhouse by the
Criminal Court for Tipton County. Subsequently in a different pro-
ceeding the act creating such court had been held unconstitutional.
Thereafter, Hall and other relators sought their release by habeas
corpus, insisting that the act creating said court was void ab initio
and relying upon the sweeping rule: "An unconstitutional act is not
a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection;
it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed." s58
The decision of the Tennessee Court in Beaver v. Hall took a position
directly opposed to Norton v. Shelby County5 9 that there can be no
de facto office under an invalid statute and declared: "We believe
that the same consideration of public policy that led the courts to
adopt the de facto doctrine as a means of protecting the rights of the
public who deal with officers acting under color of authority should
be invoked in this case to protect the acts of a tribunal organized
under an act of the legislature, apparently valid, until there has been
a judicial determination of the invalidity of such a court."00
Beaver v. Hall61 has not heretofore been overruled or disapproved
in Tennessee. It has not been criticized nor its holding questioned or
limited. On the contrary, it has been cited approvingly in numerous
subsequent cases. 2 Now the authority of Beaver v. Hall, has been
seriously weakened by State v. Superintendent, Davidson County
Workhouse, whether intentionally or not being for future opinions
to clarify. The confusion is increased by the fact that Beaver v. Hall
55. 25 AM. JuR., Habeas Corpus, § 31 (1940); 158 A.L.R. 529 (1945).
56. 142 Tenn. 416, 217 S.W. 649 (1919).
57. See Note, De jure office as condition of a de facto officer, 99 A.L.R. 294
(1935).
58. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178
(1886).
59. Ibid.
60. 142 Tenn. at 425. In Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371, 60 Sup. Ct. 317, 84 L. Ed. 329 (1940), the Supreme Court of the
United States abandoned the extreme position of Norton v. Shelby County,
and declared that "the actual existence of a statute is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored."
61. 142 Tenn. 416, 217 S.W. 649 (1919).
62. Such cases include, but are not limited to, Roberts v. Roane County
160 Tenn. 109, 23 S.W.2d 239 (1929); Ridout v. State, 161 Tenn. 248, 30 S.W.2d
255 (1930); Shoup V. M. Corp. v. Hamilton County, 178 Tenn. 14, 152 S.W.2d
1029 (1941); State ex rel. v. Wert, 178 Tenn. 21, 152 S.W.2d 1032 (1941); and
State v. Hobbs, 194 Tenn. 323, 250 S.W.2d 549 (1952),
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was cited approvingly in an opinion also by the Chief Justice on the
same day that its legal principle was denied application .
6 3
In Bricker v. Sims6 4 another phase of the problem as to the effect
of unconstitutionality was considered. The City of Martin had enacted
an ordinance forbidding any person from being on any public street
or the property of any other person without permission of the owner
after eleven o'clock at night. Bricker, charged with violation of such
ordinance, was arrested by the sheriff and a deputy sheriff, and was
fined in city court. On appeal to the circuit court the case was dis-
missed, apparently because of the invalidity of the ordinance. There-
upon Bricker sued the City of Martin, the mayor and board of alder-
men and the arresting officers for false arrest and false imprisonment.
Demurrers of all defendants were sustained and plaintiff Bricker
appealed. The Tennessee Supreme Court assumed without deciding
that the ordinance was "void,"65 but it affirmed the judgment of the
trial court in sustaining the demurrers as to all defendants.
As to the mayor and board of aldermen sued individually, the gen-
eral rule 6 was applied that in a civil action for damages the members
of a legislative body cannot be held liable for their votes for or against
particular legislation, in the absence of corruption. Another defendant,
the City of Martin, was held immune for liability by reason of the
principle that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to
municipal corporations with respect to the acts of its officers in the
exercise of governmental powers.
The arresting officers were also held not to be liable. The court
said that such officers were obligated to act upon the assumption that
public laws and municipal ordinances are constitutional until there is
a proper adjudication of unconstitutionality, and quoted approvingly
from an earlier case, as follows: "An unconstitutional act is not void
but voidable only and ministerial officers are therefore authorized to
treat every act of the Legislature as prima facie valid and they are not
liable for any acts committed under an unconstitutional statute on
account of its unconstitutionality."
67
Bricker v. Sims is one of the cases which demonstrate that for vari-
ous purposes, other than that of enforcement in its invalid form, regard
will be paid by the courts to an unconstitutional statute. The fact that
63. Bricker v. Sims, 195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953).
64. 259 S.W.2d 661. (Tenn. 1953).
65. Curfew ordinances of municipal corporations were held illegal in Mayor
etc. of Memphis v. Winfield, 27 Tenn. 707 (1848), and Ex parte McCarver, 39
Tex. Cr. R. 448, 46 S.W. 936, 42 L.R.A. 587 (1898). Cf. curfew under the war
power, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 Sup. Ct. 1375, 87 L. Ed.
1774 (1943).
66. McGuire v. Carlyle, 6 Higgins 51 (Tenn. Civ. App. 1917); 49 Am. JuR.,
States, Territories and Dependencies § 45 (1943); 22 A.L.R. 125 (1923).
67. Roberts v. Roane County, 160 Tenn. 109, 23 S.W.2d 239 (1929).
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there was an ordinance was the basis of the defense of the arresting
officers and without such ordinance, although it was assumed to be
"void" by reason of unconstitutionality, there was no defense. In
several opinions in the past twenty-five years68 the Tennessee Supreme
Court has continued to quote the sweeping generalization of Norton
v. Shelby County,69 hereinabove quoted, that an unconstitutional law
is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been
passed. Actually, such court adandoned that extreme doctrine in
1919 in Beaver v. HIal 70 and recognized at that time, as did the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1940,71 that the existence of
a statute prior to determination of its invalidity is a fact, with conse-
quences which cannot always be ignored. So long as the sweeping
generalization of Norton v. Shelby County is to be quoted but not
adhered to, there will continue to be confusion in those decisions which
ultimately turn, not upon the determination of unconstitutionality,
but, rather upon the retroactive consequences, if any, of unconstitu-
tionality.
C. Taxation
During the Survey period only two decisions72 of appellate courts
of Tennessee involved taxing statutes attacked as unconstitutional,
and in one of these the constitutional question was described as "of
minor importance.
'73
In Aday v. McMinn County Board of Education,74 the provisions of
the State Constitution requiring equality and uniformity of taxation
throughout the State75 were invoked to challenge the constitutionality
of a provision in the General Education Act of 194970 requiring all
counties and cities to increase the salaries of teachers, principals,
supervisors and superintendents. The challenged provision contained
a formula to determine the amount of the required increase in salary
for the current year as compared with the preceding scholastic year.
The contention apparently was that, because various cities and
counties are unequal in wealth and population, the requirement that
all of them increase the compensation of teachers would impose un-
equal burdens on the taxpayers by varying effects upon local tax rates.
68. State v. Hobbs, 194 Tenn. 333, 250 S.W.2d 549 (1952); Henry County v.
Standard Oil Co., 167 Tenn. 485, 71 S.W.2d 684 (1934); Roberts v. Roane
County, 160 Tenn. 123, 23 S.W.2d 243 (1929).
69. 118 U.S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178 (1886).
70. 142 Tenn. 416, 217 S.W. 649 (1919).
71. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60
Sup. Ct. 317, 84 L. Ed. 329 (1940).
72. Aday v. McMinn Co. Board of Education, 257 S.W.2d 698 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1952); Nashville Trust Co. v. Evans, 258 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1953).
73. Aday v. McMinn Co. Board of Education, 257 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tenn.
App. E.S. 1952).
74. Ibid.
75. TEx. CONST. Art. II, §§ 28-29.
76. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 9, § 9.
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The opinion of the Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, by Judge Win-
field Hale, treated the constitutional question as one of minor im-
portance and sustained the validity of the Act.
Prior to 1951, the Court of Appeals would not have had jurisdiction
in this case, such jurisdiction not extending to cases "involving con-
stitutional questions."7 7 A statute enacted in 1951 so amended the
prior law as to exclude jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by reason
of a question of constitutional law only when the case involved "the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance which is the sole determina-
tive question in the litigation."78s
In Nashville Trust Co. v. Evans,7 5 the Tennessee Supreme Court was
asked to review and overrule one of its earlier decisions, and thereby
to sustain an immunity from taxation claimed under the Federal Con-
stitution 0 and also under federal statute.8 ' The soundness of the
earlier decision, which determined a federal question, allegedly had
been impaired by a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States. The controversy arose out of these facts:
The Tennessee excise tax8 2 and the Tennessee franchise tax8 3 are
taxes levied on corporations for the privilege of doing business in
Tennessee. The excise tax is measured by net earnings within the
state and the franchise tax is based on that proportionate part of the
corporate capital stock, surplus and undivided profits employed in
doing business in Tennessee. 4 The tax commissioner required the
complaining corporations to pay excise tax measured by net earnings
without deducting therefrom interest received on United States bonds,
and to pay franchise tax measured by capital stock, surplus and un-
divided profits without deducting the value of United States bonds.
Such taxpayers insisted that the excise and franchise taxes, so com-
puted, violated the provision of the Federal Constitution authorizing
the United States to borrow money8 5 and also the federal law for-
bidding state taxation of United States bonds.8 6
Nearly two decades ago in National Life & Accident Insurance Co.
v. Dempster,7 the Tennessee Supreme Court had rejected the same
77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10618 (Williams 1934).
78. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 9.
79. 195 Tenn. 205, 258 S.W.2d 761 (1953).
80. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 2, authorizing the United States to borrow
money.
81. 31 U.S.C.A. § 742 (1954), forbidding state or local taxation of bonds
and other obligations of the United States.
82. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1316 et seq. (Williams 1934) and TENN. CODE SUPP.
§ 1316 et seq. (1950).
83. TENw. CODE SuPP. § 1248.21 et seq. (1950).
84. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 157, 162, 213 S.W.2d 45, 47
(1948).
85. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
86. 31 U.S.C.A. § 742 (1954).
87. 168 Tenn. 446, 79 S.W.2d 564 (1935).
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contention as to the excise tax and had held upon the authority of
decisions s8 of the United States Supreme Court that a corporate priv-
ilege tax measured by net earnings may properly include interest from
United States bonds as a part of such earnings. The Tennessee fran-
chise tax law was enacted subsequent to the opinion in the Dempster
case, but the decision of that case relating to the excise tax had been
followed by the tax officers in the administration of the franchise tax.
If there was no constitutional necessity for excluding interest from
United States bonds from net earnings by which the corporate priv-
ilege tax for doing business is measured, then none was perceived for
deducting the value of United States bonds when such a privilege tax
is measured by capital stock, surplus and undivided profits.
In Nashville Trust Co. v. EvangA the taxpayers asked the Court to
overrule the Dempster case upon the authority of a recent decision of
the United States Supreme Court, New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v.
Division of Tax Appeal.0° The Tennessee Court reaffirmed the holding
of National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Dempster," and distinguished
the later federal decision relied upon 2 as a tax on net worth and not
upon the privilege of exercising the corporate franchise. Further, the
Tennessee Court emphasized that the New Jersey case did not ex-
pressly overrule previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court which support the holding of the Dempster case 8
D. Due Process of Law
During the Survey period, no statute of Tennessee was held un-
constitutional, nor even challenged in a reported opinion, as a denial
of due process of law. In three cases the law of the land clause 4 was
invoked unsuccessfully in attacks upon the validity of municipal
88. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389
(1911); Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 51 Sup. Ct. 170, 75 L. Ed.
400 (1931).
89. 195 Tenn. 205, 258 S.W.2d 761 (1953).
90. 338 U.S. 665, 70 Sup. Ct. 413, 94 L. Ed. 439 (1950).
91. 168 Tenn. 446, 79 S.W.2d 564 (1935).
92. New Jersey Realty Title Co. v. Division of Tax Appeal, 338 U.S. 665,
70 Sup. Ct. 413, 94 L. Ed. 439 (1950).
93. Educational Film Corp. of America v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 51 Sup. Ct.
170, 75 L. Ed. 400 (1931); Tradesmens National Bank of Oklahoma City v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission, 309 U.S. 560, 60 Sup. Ct. 688, 84 L. Ed. 947 (1940).
94. The phrase "the law of the land" in Art. I, § 8 of the Tennessee Con-
stitution has been recognized as synonymous with the phrase "due process
of law" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States. Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tenn. 421, 431 (1899);
Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 590, 145 S.W. 177 (1911); Nance v. Piano Co.,
128 Tenn. 1, 9, 155 S.W. 1172 (1913). That the two phrases are exact equiva-
lents had been previously declared. In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97,
101, 24 L. Ed. 616, 618 (1878), the Court said: "The equivalent of the phrase
'due process of law,' according to Lord Coke, is found in the words 'law of
the land' in the Great Charter .... "
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ordinances. These cases were Jones v. City of Jackson,95 Rule v. Town
of Etowah6 and City of Chattanooga v. Fanbug.
97
Jones v. City of Jackson9s involved an attack upon an ordinance
regulating the holding of auctions as violative of the law of the land
(due process of law) clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Complain-
ant had appealed from a decree of the chancery court which sustained
the validity of the ordinance with certain deletions. After such
deletions the ordinance required persons holding auctions, except
judicial sales and sales by trustees, etc., to apply for and obtain
a permit. Such permit was conditioned upon the giving of a bond in
the sum of $1,000 and upon the filing of information as to the name,
address and occupation of the person conducting the auction, as to
the name, address and occupation of the person for whom the auction
was to be conducted, as to the place and hour of the auction and its
estimated duration, and as to auction sales by applicant or owner
within the past two years.
Based upon the proposition that the business of auctioneering is a
legitimate subject of regulation to protect the public and to minimize
deception,9 9 the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court by Justice
Prewitt sustained the ordinance as it remained after deletions by the-
chancery court. The legal principle was given application that where
the invalid part is severable from the rest, the portion of a statute
or ordinance which remains after elision may be held constitutional.
Apparently no contention was made in the Supreme Court that the
elided portion of the ordinance should have been held valid, and,
hence, this matter was not discussed. The elided parts of the ordi-
nance required an applicant for license to give (1) the name and
address of the owner of property to be auctioned, with itemized, sworn
inventory as to cost, (2) copy of proposed advertisements, and (3)
reasons for conducting auction.
Rule v. Town of Etowah'0 0 involved the validity of a municipal
ordinance, the practical effect of which was to forbid the sale of beer
within the town. The question arose from a bill filed in the chancery
court to procure a decree declaring the ordinance unconstitutional.
From a decree sustaining a demurrer complainants appealed.
A general state law'01 permits the sale of beer under circumstances
prescribed in the statute. By such law county courts are authorized
to forbid the sale of beer at any point closer than 2000 feet to a church
95. 195 Tenn. 329, 259 S.W.2d 649 (1953).
96. 195 Tenn. 634, 263 S.W.2d 498 (1953).
97. 265 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1954).
98. 195 Tenn. 329, 259 S.W.2d 649 (1953).
99. Id. at 652.
100. 263 S.W.2d 498 (Tenn. 1953).
101. TENN. CODE SuPP. § 1191.1 et seq. (1950).
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or school10 2 and municipalities are authorized to "impose additional
restrictions, fixing zones and territories... and such other rules and
regulations as will promote public health, morals and safety as they
may by ordinance provide.''1 °3 The Town of Etowah adopted an
ordinance forbidding the sale of beer at any point in the town within
5000 feet of a church or school, and such ordinance prohibited the sale
of beer within the corporate limits. The contention was that such
ordinance suspended a general law, to-wit, a revenue statute. The
opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court by Justice Tomlinson sus-
tained the ordinance. 0 4 Such opinion held that the general law regu-
lating the sale of beer'0 5 is a police measure as well as a revenue
measure and reaffirmed a prior case' 06 holding that the business of
selling beer is subject to unlimited restriction, so that an ordinance
prohibiting its sale does not violate the law of the land clause. 0 7
City of Chattanooga v. Fanburg -0 involved the validity of an ordi-
nance regulating and licensing auto wrecker and towing service.
Such ordinance required those engaged in the business of offering
towing service in Chattanooga by use of a wrecker or auto adapted
to that purpose to obtain a license, the issuance of which was condi-
tioned upon application therefor setting forth certain information,
upon the payment of a license fee and upon the carrying of insurance
as prescribed in the ordinance' 9 The ordinance required one engaged
in such business to provide 24-hour service, including holidays, to
have a minimum of two wreckers or towing cars and two men on
duty at all times, and it prescribed maximum charges for wrecker,
towing and storage service. It also prohibited any operator of a
wrecker or towing car from taking his wrecker or towing car to the
scene of a wreck without being called by the owner, the owner's agent
or a police dispatcher.
Fanburg, who had not applied for or obtained a license as required
by the ordinance, took his wrecker or towing car from his place of
business to a wreck without being called by the owner or the owner's
agent or the police dispatcher and was charged with violating the
ordinance. The criminal court held the ordinance void as violating the
constitutional provision which prohibits the passage of any law for
the benefit of individuals inconsistent with the general laws"0 and as
102. T=Nm. CODE SUPP. § 1191.14 (1950).
103. Ibid.
104. 263 S.W.2d 498 (Tenn. 1953).
105. TENN. CODE SuPP. § 1191.1 et seq. (1950).
106. Grubb v. Mayor and Aldermen of Morristown, 185 Tenn. 114, 203
S.W.2d 593 (1947).
107. TENN. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
108. 265 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1954).
109. The ordinance in full is copied as a footnote to the opinion, 265 S.W.2d
15 (Tenn. 1954).
110. TErN. CONST. Art. XI, § 8..
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violating the law of the land clause of the Tennessee Constitution'1
and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 12 The
City appealed.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Burnett
reversed and sustained the validity of the ordinance.1 3 Legislative
sanction for the ordinance was found in a provision of the Charter
of the City of Chattanooga."14 The constitutionality of the ordinance
was upheld, based upon the propositions that the business of transport-
ing property for hire is a privilege subject to legislative control, that
the regulation of roads and streets is also subject to legislative control,
that such legislative powers may be delegated to the cities and that
a city may regulate auto wrecker and towing service, not alone through
its licensing power, but also in the exercise of police power to prevent
traffic congestion and dangers incident thereto. The Supreme Court
of the United States was quoted:
"It is well established law that the highways of the state are public
property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and
that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which,
generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit.""5
E. Separation of Powers.
Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commis-
sion," 6 was the only decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court during
the Survey period in which the Court was divided on a constitutional
question. The Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, after hearing
and the introduction of evidence, had granted Robinson Freight Lines
certificates of convenience and necessity to haul freight over eight
highway routes in Tennessee. Those opposing the applications filed
petitions for certiorari, which were granted, and the case was heard
in the chancery court. The Chancellor found that there was no evi-
dence whatever to support the issuance of certificates over five of
these routes, but that there was material, substantial evidence to
support the issuance over the remaining three routes, and therefore
held the Commission's action as to the five certificates was arbitrary
and illegal, but its action as to the other three certificates was legal.
There was no appeal from the decree insofar as it annulled five
111. TENN. CoNsT. Art I, § 8.
112. U. S. CONST. AMED. XIV.
113. 265 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1954).
114. Tenn. Private Acts 1941, c. 536, subs. 16, gives the City of Chattanooga
authority "to license, tax and regulate taxicabs, automobiles for hire, trucks
and buses; to fix a rate to be charged for the carriage of persons and property
by any vehicle held out to the public use for hire within the City; to require
indemnity bonds, issued by surety companies or indemnity insurance policies
to be fMied with the City by the owner or operator of any such vehicle.
115. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 256, 33 Sup. Ct. 181, 184, 77 L. Ed.
288, 294 (1932).
116. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
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certificates, but there was an appeal as to the other three certificates.
When the Commission granted the eight challenged certificates a
section 7 of the procedural statute"8 regulating the writ of certiorari
directed the court in reviewing the findings of fact of an administrative
board to "reduce his findings of fact and conclusions of law to writing
and make them parts of the record." An act of 1951,119 passed after
the decision of the Commission, but prior to the decision of the
Chancellor, amended this section so as to provide that "in making
such findings of fact the Chancellor shall weigh the evidence and
determine the facts by the preponderance of the proof." The whole
case turned upon the effect, if any, to be given the Act of 1951, with
the Chancellor, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all taking
different views of the statute.
The Chancellor held that the amendatory Act of 1951120 had no
application to review of administrative action taken prior to its
passage, but that such administrative action was to be reviewed under
the procedure for a common law writ of certiorari established and
existing prior thereto. The Court of Appeals held that such Act of
1951, being procedural merely, applied to judicial review subsequent
to its passage, although the administrative action being reviewed had
taken place prior to its passage, that there was material, substantial
evidence to support the findings of the Commission as to the three
routes in controversy, but that the evidence strongly "preponderated"
against the findings of the Commission. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals cancelled the order of the Commission granting the three
disputed certificates.12 ' The Tennessee Supreme Court in its
opinion 22 by Justice Gailor, with a dissenting opinion by Justice
Tomlinson, held that to construe the Act of 1951123 as it had been
interpreted by the Court of Appeals would render it unconstitutional
"for the reasons stated in the opinion In re Cumberland Power Co."'1 4
in that the court would be required to perform an administrative or
legislative function and as violating the constitutional separation of
the powers of government into three distinct and independent depart-
ments.125
117. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9014 (Williams 1934).
118. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9008-9018 (Williams 1934).
119. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 261.
120. Ibid.
121. The- holding of the Court of Appeals is stated in the opinion of the
Supreme Court.
122. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
123. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 261.
124' 147 Tenn. 504, 249 S.W. 818 (1922).
125. TENN. C6NST*. Art. II, §§ 1 and 2, divides the powers of government
into three departments and forbids the exercise by one of these departments of
"any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the
cases herein directed or permitted." I I . . ..
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The Tennessee Supreme Court, reaffirming that Code Sections 9008-
9018 apply to the procedure under both petitions for the common law
writ of certiorari126 and the statutory writ of certiorari,'2 7 held that
the common law writ does not bring up for determination any question
except whether the inferior board or tribunal (1) has exceeded its
jurisdiction, or (2) has acted illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently. The
court further 'held that the effect of the amendatory act of 1951128 was
"only to require the Chancellor to review the evidence which had
been introduced before the Commission, and to determine by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence whether the Commission had acted beyond
its jurisdiction, arbitrarily, fraudulently or illegally." Such being the
"long established limit of appropriate judicial review under the com-
mon law writ," the amendatory act of 1951 was construed as having
no effect on procedure under the common law writ, whatever its
effect "on a proceeding under the statutory writ." The opinion further
declared that whether a certificate of convenience and necessity shall
be issued to motor carriers over public highways is an administrative
function no different from action in the rate-making power.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Tomlinson made these points: (1)
that the interpretation given by the majority opinion to the act of
1951 renders that statute meaningless, (2) that the majority decision is
not supported by the clearly distinguishable case of In re Cumberland
Power Co.,',- which held unconstitutional a statute that sought to
confer original jurisdiction upon the Tennessee Supreme Court, whose
constitutional jurisdiction is appellate only,130 and (3) that the func-
tion of reviewing the conclusions of fact of an administrative board
for the purpose of determining whether they are supported "by -the
preponderance of the proof" is a judicial function.
With due deference to the majority opinion,' 31 the writer believes
that the dissenting opinion of Justice Tomlinson is the correct con-
clusion.
132
The majority opinion does not seriously insist that its construction
of the Act of 1951133 was a true expression of the legislative intent.'-3
126. A writ of certiorari is provided by TENN. CODE ANN. § 8989 (Williams
1934) "in all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising ju-
dicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or is acting illegally,
when in the judgment of'the court, there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy." This continues to be referred to as the common law writ, although
in strictness it is statutory and no common law writ now exists in Tennessee.
127. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8990 (Williams 1934).
128. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 261.
129. 147 Tenn. 504, 249 S.W. 818 (1922).
130. TENN. CONST. Art. VI, § 2.
131. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
132. A contrary view is taken by Forrest V. Lacey, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action in Tennessee, 23 TENN. L..REv. 349, 352 (1954).
133. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 261.
134. Prior to the opinion under discussion, but not referred to therein, Tenn.
Pub. Acts 1953, c. 162, had been enacted: This is -a procedural statute with
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The strained interpretation of the Act of 1951 by the majority opinion
was deemed necessary to save its constitutionality. Unless necessarily
avoided for constitutional reasons, the obvious meaning of the Act of
1951, as held by the Court of Appeals and by Justice Tomlinson, is that
the court shall determine whether a fact conclusion of an administra-
tive commission is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. It
is submitted that a statute so providing is by clear implication a legis-
lative declaration that administrative action not supported by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence is unlawful.
In Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Com-
mission,35 therefore, the controlling question as to the' constitution-
ality of the statute is this: Does the legislature have the power to
make illegal the decisions of administrative boards created by it when
such decisions are not supported by a preponderance of the proof?
The dissenting opinion indicates that this question requires an
affirmative answer. The writer believes this is correct for the reason
that the branch of government which is empowered to define and
determine legality, as distinguished from constitutionality, is the
legislative department. The majority recognizes that on certiorari
the court reviews the record to determine "whether the inferior board
or tribunal ... has acted illegally," but then it holds in effect that
the legislature is without power to define "illegally," i.e., is powerless
to change the common law as it existed under the common law writ
of certiorari. The relief afforded by the common law writ of certiorari
may not be taken away in view of the constitutional provision securing
it,3 6 but, as Justice Tomlinson says, "the quantity and quality of
relief may be increased."
The Act of 1951, construed as requiring a reviewing court to deter-
mine whether an administrative board has acted illegally in that its
findings of fact are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence,
is to be distinguished from such a statute as was held unconstitutional
in Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co."7 The statute
there involved, the Radio Act of 1927, provided that the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, on appeal from decisions of the
Radio Commission should "hear, review, and determine the appeal"
upon the record made before the Commission and upon such additional
evidence as the court might receive, and was empowered to "alter or
revise the decision appealed from and enter such judgment as to it
respect to the Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, section 29 of which
authorizes the reviewing court to reverse the Commission's decision, inter alia,
if "unsupported by the preponderance of the proof in view of the entire record
before the Commission."
135. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
136. TENN. CONST. Art. VI, § 10.
137. 281 U.S. 464, 50 Sup. Ct. 389, 74 L. Ed. 969 (1930).
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may seem just."'13 It was held that this provision made the court "a
superior and revising agency" in the administrative field and conse-
quently its decision was not a judicial judgment reviewable by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The Tennessee Act of 1951 9 does not purport to authorize the
court upon review to make such decision as it thinks the Commission
should have made. Such Act, an amendment to the procedural act
as to certiorari, merely gives the court power to set aside for illegality
administrative orders not supported by a preponderance of the proof.
Such statute, it is submitted, no more attempts to make a court play
a part in the administrative process than does a statute authorizing
the judiciary to set aside administrative decisions not made in com-
pliance with statutory procedural formalities or not supported by any
material evidence. Under the Act of 1951, as construed by the Court
of Appeals and Justice Tomlinson, the court examines the record, not
for the purpose of deciding what administrative action the commission
should have taken and the reviewing court will take, but solely for
the purpose of adjudging whether the decision of the administrative
agency is supported by a preponderance of the proof. If so, the action
of the board is adjudged lawful; but, if not so, the action of the board
is adjudged illegal and is set aside.
In determining whether a statute providing for judicial review of
administrative decisions violates the constitutional principle of separa-
tion of powers, the basic question is whether the function to be exer-
cised by the court is a judicial one.140 If such function is a judicial
one, its character is not affected by the fact that the administrative
decision was itself of a legislative character.141 The function of weigh-
ing the evidence to see where the preponderance is, as Justice Tom-
linson said, "has always been considered a proper function for the
courts."
F. Miscellaneous
Easterly v. Dempster'4 2 was the only decision in Tennessee touching
on the segregation question. It resulted from an action by members
of the negro race, residents of Knoxville, asserting the right under
the equal protection clause 43 to equal-use of the golfing facilities at a
138. 44 STAT. 1169 (1927).
139. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 261.
140. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. B. & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266,
277, 53 Sup. Ct. 627, 77 L. Ed. 1166, 1174, (1933); "The controlling question
is whether the function to be exercised by the Court is a judicial function, and,
if so, it may be exercised on an authorized appeal from the decision of an
administrative body."
141. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S.
716, 722, 49 Sup. Ct. 499, 73 L. Ed. 918, 925.
142. 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
143. U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
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municipally-owned golf course. District Judge Robert L. Taylor re-
ferred to "the principle that negroes are entitled to equal facilities
with members of the white race with respect to certain recreational
facilities including parks, golf courses, swimming pools and municipal
auditoriums,"'144 but such principle was held not to be applicable
where the city had leased the golf course to private operators for
financial reasons, i.e., a substantial rental, the lease did not exclude
persons of color from using the golf course, and the lessee was not a
party to the judicial proceeding.
Deitch v. City of Chattanooga.14 5 An ordinance of Chattanooga (No.
4030) made it unlawful for any person in the city to possess the federal
wagering stamp provided for by federal statute146 and made violation
a misdemeanor punishable by fine. The federal statute with reference
to the wagering stamp expressly provides that payment of the tax
does not exempt any person from penalty or punishment by state law
and does not authorize commencement or continuance of such business.
Another ordinance (No. 4048) made possession of a federal wagering
stamp and payment of the federal tax on wagers "conclusive evidence"
of violation of the gambling or wagering ordinance of the city. Deitch,
shown by undisputed evidence to possess a federal wagering stamp,
was fined by city court for violation of the city ordinance. On appeal
to the Criminal Court the cases were heard de novo and Deitch was
fined in three cases, in two cases for gaming and in one case for "pos-
sessing a gaming device."
On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court the contention was that
the two ordinances, No. 4030 and No. 4048, were unconstitutional, and
hence the fine for possessing a gaming device was erroneous.
As to Ordinance No. 4048, making possession of the federal stamp
and payment of the federal tax "conclusive evidence" of the violation
of the gambling ordinance, the opinion by Justice Gailor,'147 upon the
authority of the earlier case of Diamond v. State,48 agreed with the
insistence as to invalidity if the question were actually presented, but
held that such question was not necessary to a disposition of the case
because Deitch did not offer evidence and the city did not rely upon
the provision as to conclusive evidence, but the city conceded that its
proof merely made a "prima facie" case.
As to Ordinance No. 4030, the contention for invalidity was based
upon the constitutional provision which protects against self-incrimi-
144. Citing Beale v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951); Harris v. City
of Daytona Beach, 105 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Fla. 1952); Lawrence v. Hancock 76
F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W. Va. 1948); and Kern v. City Comm'rs of City of Newton,
151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709, 129 A.L.R. 1156 (1940).
145. 195 Tenn. 245, 258 S.W.2d 776 (1953).
146. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3290 et seq. (1940).
147. 195 Tenn. 245, 258 S.W.2d 776 (1953).
148. 123 Tenn. 348, 131 S.W. 666 (1910).
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nation and guarantees an accused the right to meet the witnesses face
to face.149 In accord with its prior decisions 5 the Court held that the
constitutional provision relied upon, applicable only to "criminal
prosecutions," did not apply to a proceeding for violation of a munici-
pal ordinance, which is civil in nature. The Fourteenth Amendment
was not invoked, but quite recently in Irvine v. California'5 the con-
tention was rejected that the guaranty of due process of law prevents
a state from using "compelled evidence" obtained under the federal
wagering statute. In so holding the United States Supreme Court did
little more than refer to its opinion in United States v. Kahriger,'52
where the federal wagering tax was sustained against the contention,
inter alia, that it violated the guarantee against self-incrimination of
the Fifth Amendment.
In Trent v. State,5 3 opinion by Justice Gailor, there was involved
the constitutionality and interpretation of the statute providing a sum-
mary proceeding for the removal of a clerk of a court "upon conviction
of a misdemeanor in office or of a felony."'154 Trent had been elected
to a four-year term as Circuit and Criminal Court Clerk of Hamblen
County. During his term of office he was convicted in federal court
upon a plea of guilty for violation of the Mann Act 155 and was given
a suspended sentence. Following a joint hearing by the Circuit and
Criminal Courts, Trent was removed from office under the summary
proceeding provided by statute.156
On appeal (writ of error) Trent insisted that the judgment of re-
moval violated his constitutional right to the four-year term to which
he had been elected. This contention was rejected on the basis of
earlier holdings that election for a definite term carries with it the
implied condition of good behavior.157
Trent also urged that the exclusive method for removing civil of-
ficers, including clerks of courts, is prescribed by the provision of the
Tennessee Constitution that such officers upon conviction for crimes
of misdemeanors in office "shall be removed from office by said court
... and shall be subject to such other punishment as may be prescribed
by law." 6 Also in accord with earlier decisions 5 9 it was reaffirmed
149. TEaN. CONST. Art. I, § 9.
150. City of Nashville v. Baker, 167 Tenn. 661, 73 S.W.2d 170 (1934), and
cases cited therein.
151. 74 Sup. Ct. 384 (U.S. 1954).
152. 345 U.S. 22, 73 Sup. Ct. 510, 97 L. Ed. 754 (1953).
153. 195 Tenn. 350, 259 S.W.2d 657 (1953).
154. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10076 et seq. (Williams 1934).
155. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1421 et seq. (1950).
156. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10076 et seq. (Williams 1934).
157. Sevier v. Justices, 7 Tenn. 334 (1824).
158. TENN. CONST. Art. V, § 5.
159. Ragsdale v. State, 32 Tenn. 416 (1852)-; State ex rel. v. Howse,-132 Tenn.




that such constitutional provision relates alone to criminal proceedings
and has nothing to do with a civil proceeding for the summary removal
of a public officer. As to clerks of courts such civil proceeding for
summary removal' 60 was held authorized by the constitutional pro-
vision for removal from office "for malfeasance, incompetency, or
neglect of duty, in such manner as may be prescribed by law."
101
A contention that the statute authorizing removal does not apply
to conviction in federal court for a felony, but is limited to a felony in
office was also rejected, and the statute was construed to be applicable
to all felonies, but only to misdemeanors in office. In view of the
statutory language 62 no other plausible construction was possible.
Thrasher v. Lively 6" was a proceeding to challenge the constitution-
ality of a private act 64 by which the salaries of the judges of the Court
of General Sessions of Hamilton County were increased during the
term for which they were elected. A constitutional provision specifies
that the compensation of "Judges of the Supreme or Inferior Courts"
shall not be increased or diminished during the time for which they
are elected.165 The rather hopeless effort to sustain the Act was based
upon the contention that a general sessions judge is not a judge of an
inferior court, as contemplated by the Constitution. The chancellor,
unimpressed by such argument, held the act unconstitutional.
On appeal the Tennessee Supreme Court was also unmoved by the
contention and in an opinion by Justice Prewitt affirmed the decree
holding the act violative of the Constitution. It was pointed out that
in prior decisions 66 the court had assumed or stated that judges of
general sessions courts are judges of inferior courts within the mean-
ing of the Constitution, and it was reasoned that where the powers and
jurisdiction of the several justices of the peace in a county are con-
solidated in one court, this (General Sessions Court) is one of the
inferior courts, as to which the compensation of the judges cannot
be increased or diminished during the term of office.
Dowlen v. Fitch6 7 involved the interpretation and validity of an
Act of 1953168 providing that in tort actions where plaintiff and de-
fendant are residents of different counties of Tennessee action may be
brought in the county in which the cause of action arose. Prior to the
160. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10076 et seq. (Williams 1934).
161. TENN. CONST. Art. VI, § 13.
162. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10076 provides: "The court may remove its clerk
upon conviction of a misdemeanor in office or of a felony...
163. 263 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1953).
164. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1953, c. 25.
165. TENN. CONST. Art. VI, § 7.
166. Bickford v. Swafford, 194 Tenn. 481, 253 S.W.2d 557 (1952); Taylor v.
Wilson County, 188 Tenn. 39, 216 S.W.2d 717 (1949).
167. 264 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. 1954) and 266 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. 1954), rehears-
ing denied.
168. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 34.
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enactment of such statute the right of action generally followed the
person of the defendant who might be sued only in the county in
which he was found.169 A resident of Cheatham County was injured
in an automobile collision occurring in Cheatham County prior to the
passage of the new venue statute.170 The injured person brought an
action in Cheatham County against two residents of Hamilton County,
Tennessee, the owner and the driver of one of the motor vehicles in-
volved in the collision.
The trial court sustained pleas in abatement filed by the defendants,
but on appeal the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed. The opinions71
by Special Justice Weldon B. White held that with respect to a tort
committed prior to the effective date472 of the venue statute, such law
permitted an action in the county where the tort was committed and
further held that the statute so construed did not violate the con-
stitutional provision forbidding retrospective laws. 73 The holding is
in accord with prior Tennessee decisions both as to the interpretation
of the statute'7 4 and as to its constitutionality when so construed. 175
Carr v. State ex rel Armour.'7 6 Under t'he provisions of a general
law1'7 7 the quarterly court of Hardeman County elected a superin-
tendent of schools for a term of four years from January 15, 1953, to
January 15, 1957. Shortly thereafter a private act 78 was enacted
which provided for election of the superintendent of schools of
Hardeman County by popular vote, the first such election to be held
in August, 1954, for a term of four years to begin on September 1,
following election. The private act also named as county superinten-
dent to serve from the date of its passage, February 19, 1953, until
169. TENN. CODE ANI. § 8640 (Williams 1934) provides: "In all transitory
actions, the right of action follows the person of the defendant, unless other-
wise expressly provided." Where plaintiff and defendant both reside in the
same county [TENN. CODE ANN. § 8641 (Williams 1934)] or where the plaintiff
and a material defendant reside in the county where the cause of action accrued
[(Tims v. Carter, 192 Tenn. 386, 241 S.W.2d 501, (1951)], that county is the
only proper venue for an otherwise transitory action.
170. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 34.
171. 264 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. 1954) and 266 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. 1954).
172. March 23, 1953.
173. TENN. CONST. Art. I, § 20 provides: "That no retrospective law, or law
impairing the obligations of contracts, shall be made." This section has been
interpreted to read: "That no retrospective law which impairs the obligation
of contracts, or any other law which impairs their obligation, shall be made."
Hamilton County v. Gerlach, 176 Tenn. 288, 140 S.W.2d 1084 (1940).
174. Collins v. East Tennessee V. & G. Railroad, 56 Tenn. 841 (1874); Cav-
ender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S.W. 767 (1921); National Life & Acc. Ins.
Co. v. Atwood, 29 Tenn. App. 141, 194 S.W.2d 350 (1946).
175. Collins v. East Tennessee V. & G. Railroad, 56 Tenn. 841 (1874); Cav-
ender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S.W. 767 (1921); Sherrill v. Thomason, 145
Tenn. 499, 238 S.W. 876 (1921); State v. Bone, 185 Tenn. 78, 203 S.W.2d 362
(1947).
176. 265 S.W.2d 556 (Tenn. 1954).
177. TENN. CODE SuPP. § 2320 b (1950).
178. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1953, c. 19.
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September 1, 1954, a person other than the incumbent previously
elected by the quarterly court. The private act was attacked as vio-
lating the constitutional provision which requires that county offices
created by the legislature shall be filled by the people or the county
court.
17 9
The Tennessee Supreme Court in its opinion by Justice Burnett 80
affirmed the decree of the chancellor and held that the office of super-
intendent of schools of Hardeman County was in existence prior to
enactment of the private act providing for election by the people, and
hence an attempt by the legislature to fill such existing office violated
the constitutional requirement for election by the quarterly court or
by the people. 81 The opinion points to a line of cases holding that
where the legislature attempts to fill an office that is in existence
such constitutional provision is violated,8 2 and distinguishes the
cases sustaining the power of the legislature upon the creation of a
county office to be filled by popular election to appoint the person to
hold such office until the next general election. 8 3 Citing precedents for
invalidating portions of acts by which unconstitutional interim ap-
pointments were attempted,' 84 the Court further held that the invalid
provision attempting to fill the existing office was capable of elision,
so that the remainder of the private act was constitutional.
179. TENN. CONST. Art. XI, § 17.
180. 265 S.W.2d 556 (Tenn. 1954).
181. TENN. CONST. Art. XI, § 17.
182. Treadway v. Carter County, 173 Tenn. 393, 118 S.W.2d 222 (1937), and
cases cited therein.
183. Taylor v. Taylor, 189 Tenn. 81, 222 S.W.2d 372 (1949); Crewse v. Beeler,
186 Tenn. 475, 212 S.W.2d 39 (1948); Townsend v. Ray, 174 Tenn. 634, 130
S.W.2d 96 (1939).
184. Kyle v. Marcom, 181 Tenn. 57, 178 S.W.2d 618 (1944); Cheatham
County v. Murff, 176 Tenn. 93, 138 S.W.2d 430 (1940).
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